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THE BATTLE OVER CORPORATE BYLAWS
Ariel Beverly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations face unprecedented levels of shareholder litigation.
Yet, the rise in litigation does not appear attributable to increased
instances of director and officer misbehavior. Consider the fact that
in 2011, “96 percent of all mergers and acquisitions valued at or over
$500 million were subject to litigation.”1 In 2013, 97.5 percent of all
deals over $100 million were challenged and “each transaction
triggered an average of seven separate lawsuits.”2
If the challenged mergers and acquisitions tended to result in
some commensurate benefit to shareholders, then the proliferation of
shareholder suits would not warrant scrutiny or a corporate response.
However, a report by Cornerstone Research studying 612 law suits
found that none went to trial and “all judgments, including summary
judgments or judgments on the pleadings were granted to the
defendants.”3 In 2015, shareholders lost about $183 billion related to
all securities class actions¾an increase of 25% from the year
before.4 Moreover, median settlement amounts have failed to exceed

* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Sociology,
University of California, Berkeley. Thank you to Professor Elizabeth Pollman for your guidance
and support throughout the writing process (and beyond), the members of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their hard work preparing this Comment for publication, and my family
and friends for their everlasting encouragement.
1. Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum
Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 335 (2013).
2. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015).
3. Investors Sued in 94% of M&A Deals Over $100 Million in 2013, Report Finds,
WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP., Mar. 2014, at *1.
4. NERA: Investor Losses on US Filings Amount to 183 Billion, CONSULTANCY.UK (Feb. 8,
2016), http://www.consultancy.uk/news/3258/nera-investor-losses-on-us-filings-amount-to-183billion; Investor Losses and Aggregated Securities Class Action Settlements Increased in 2015,
FRT (Apr. 14, 2016), http://frtservices.com/investor-losses-and-aggregated-securities-classaction-settlements-increased-in-2015.
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3% of total alleged investor losses for the last 15 years and dropped
to 1.4% in the first six months of 2016.5
In response to the significant amount of shareholder litigation
and concerns about its cost and utility, many corporations have
adopted bylaw provisions aimed at curtailing or limiting this
litigation by, for example, providing for a shifting of fees to plaintiffshareholders.6 As a general matter, corporate bylaws structure the
internal governance of corporate affairs.7 Bylaws typically provide
requirements for the time, place, and manner of conducting and
giving notice of shareholders’ and directors’ meetings, the use and
execution of proxies, quorum for committee and directors’ meetings,
appointment of the board, etc.8 Most corporate codes, including the
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), include a provision
that allows corporate bylaws to contain any provision consistent with
the law so long as the bylaw relates to the business of the corporation
and the conduct of its affairs.9 The freedom and flexibility granted by
such bylaws have spurred “innovative litigation reform efforts in the
form of bylaw revisions.”10
Corporate bylaw provisions defining the parameters of
shareholder litigation, such as those concerning the shifting of fees in
shareholder litigation, have ignited fierce debate among attorneys,
legislatures, and scholars.11 “Issues about their use are embedded in
broader debates over the value of shareholder litigation, the role of
private enforcement, the comparative power of shareholders and
directors, the role of Delaware in U.S. corporate law, and other
longstanding, polarized, and possibly intractable fights.”12

5. Monica K. Loseman, 2016 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 30, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2016/07/30/
2016-mid-year-securities-litigation-update/.
6. C. HUGH FRIEDMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE CORPORATIONS ¶ 4:397
(2017).
7. Id. at ¶ 4:397.11.
8. See id. at. ¶ 4:196.
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2015).
10. Stephen Bainbridge, Oklahoma Leads on Fee Shifting Bylaws, Will Delaware and
MCBA
Follow?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Oct.
2,
2014),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/10/oklahoma-leads-on-feeshifting-bylaws-will-delaware-and-mbca-follow.html.
11. Verity Winship, Contracting Around Securities Litigation: Some Thoughts on the Scope
of Litigation Bylaws, 68 SMU L. REV. 913, 913 (2015).
12. Id.
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This Comment contextualizes the recent Delaware Chancery
Court decision in Solak v. Sarowitz13 within that debate. Solak
involved two shareholder litigation bylaws unilaterally adopted by a
corporation’s board of directors. One provision directed that
Delaware be the exclusive forum for all internal corporate claims.14
The second provision imposed costs and attorneys’ fees upon a
shareholder who brought internal corporate claims outside the state
of Delaware¾unless the plaintiff obtained a judgment that
substantially achieved the full remedy sought.15
The board adopted these provisions after a series of
developments in Delaware corporate law. The period began with a
Chancery Court opinion recognizing the validity of forum selection
provisions in corporate bylaws,16 followed by a decision from the
Delaware Supreme Court upholding a fee-shifting provision.17
Shortly after the holdings, the legislature amended the DGCL. One
amendment codified the Chancery Court decision that established the
validity of forum selection provisions.18 The other amendment
essentially overturned the Delaware Supreme Court’s recognition of
fee-shifting provisions and expressly prohibited bylaws that would
burden a shareholder-plaintiff with the attorneys’ fees of the
corporation.19 In Solak, the Chancery Court resolved any uncertainty
as to whether the concurrent amendments signaled the validity of
limited fee-shifting provisions that would only be implicated when a
shareholder brought a claim outside of Delaware in violation of a
forum selection bylaw.20 The court definitively held that the DGCL
prohibited any form of fee-shifting provisions in corporate bylaws.21
After locating fee-shifting bylaws in the social and political
discourse, this Comment advocates enabling statutory schemes that
grant entities the space and flexibility to innovatively experiment in
13. 153 A.3d 729 (Del. Ch. 2016), appeal denied, 154 A.3d 1167 (Del. 2017).
14. Id. at 733.
15. Id.
16. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
17. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2017).
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (West 2017).
20. Meredith E. Kotler & Mark E. McDonald, Chancery Court Invalidates Bylaw
Purporting to Shift Litigation Expenses onto Stockholders who Violate a Valid Forum-Selection
Bylaw, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.clearymawatch.com/2017/01/chancerycourt-invalidates-bylaw-purporting-shift-litigation-expenses-onto-stockholders-violate-validforum-selection-bylaw/#more-2293.
21. Id.
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their corporate governance structures. Allowing corporations to
develop diverse choices in corporate governance encourages
efficiency and innovation that enriches the entire corporate
landscape.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II examines the
development of shareholder litigation provisions in corporate
governance documents, Part III explores the different perspectives
advocated in the literature, and Part IV concludes by suggesting
areas for future scholarship.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EMERGENCE OF LITIGATION PROVISIONS IN
CORPORATE BYLAWS
This Part examines the appearance of shareholder litigation
provisions in corporate governance documents. It provides the
background of the matters at issue in Solak and demonstrates the
resourcefulness that private ordering responses foster.
A. Exclusive Forum Selection Provisions
In the past decade, shareholder litigation reached a level that
caused commentators to describe the situation as a “crisis.”22
Alongside the rise of shareholder litigation was a rise in the
proportion of suits filed outside the state of Delaware. Roberta
Romano and Sarath Sanga reported that most complaints brought
against Delaware corporations were filed exclusively in Delaware in
2000, but by 2010 Delaware corporations were defending over half
of their lawsuits in multiple forums and a third exclusively out of
state.23
In the case of multi-forum litigation, a corporation is forced to
defend the same claims for the same class in multiple forums.24 The
causes and consequences of the multi-forum phenomenon are
thought to be unrelated and adverse to stockholder welfare.25

22. Stephen Brainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 851, 852 (2016) (“In recent years, [shareholder litigation] reached crisis proportions.”); Sean J.
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“The patterns [. . .] reveal a crisis in shareholder
litigation.”).
23. Roberta Romano and Sarath Sanga, The Private Order Solution to Multiforum
Shareholding Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 34 (2017).
24. Winship, supra note 11, at 915.
25. Grundfest, supra note 1, at 340.
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Plaintiffs’ counsel have an incentive to maximize their fees, leading
them to file claims in forums believed to be generous in the award of
attorneys’ fees—apparently Delaware Courts have a reputation of
being frugal in this regard.26 Additionally, “plaintiff’s counsel may
file multiple lawsuits as part of a rational business model designed
‘to get a seat at the table . . . because it gives them a better shot at the
action and better leverage in terms of fees.’”27 And of course,
strategic forum selection, which secures an advantage by way of
procedural rules or having a case heard before a judge tasked with
applying unfamiliar law, is not unusual.28 However, unlike the
typical forum shopping context, shareholders’ interests are
disadvantaged by tactical filings aimed to generate delay or
uncertainty in rulings.29 Scholarship further documents other
perverse effects that arise from shareholder litigation.30 Allowing
claims to be litigated in multiple forums simultaneously wastes
judicial resources, creates an opportunity for conflicting outcomes,
and unjustifiably taxes shareholders’ investments to compensate
attorneys for pleading and defending the same lawsuit in multiple
jurisdictions.31
Lawmakers, commentators, and attorneys have suggested
various means to resolve the multi-forum problem.32 Vice Chancellor
Travis Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court endorsed the use of
forum selection provisions to remedy the problem in a 2010 decision,
In re Revlon, Inc., Shareholders Litigation,33 writing that “if boards
of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would
provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute
resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”34
Corporations promptly acted. Hundreds of publicly traded entities
26. Id.
27. Id. at 341.
28. Id. at 342.
29. Id. at 342–43.
30. See id. at 341–42; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Forum Selection Clauses and the Market
for Settlements, N.Y.L.J. (May 17, 2012), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=b24c6303-640c43bb-9fbc-37d452145c9f&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-NYLAWJ1202554035470&pdbypasscitatordocs=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true&cbc=0.
31. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 3, 5.
32. Winship, supra note 11, at 915.
33. 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010).
34. Id.; Winship, supra note 11, at 915; Coffee, supra note 30, at 1.
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adopted intra-corporate forum selection provisions.35 Shortly
thereafter, “a brouhaha . . . erupted over [their] validity.”36
The Delaware Chancery Court formally addressed forum
selection provisions in a 2013 case, Boilermakers v. Chevron.37 The
court found the bylaws at issue to be valid and enforceable
contractual clauses.38 The decision relied upon the corporation-ascontract paradigm wherein shareholders are deemed to have
consented to the authority of the board of directors.39 The enabling
structure of the Delaware corporate code allows corporate charters to
include provisions that grant directors the ability to adopt bylaws
unilaterally.40
Chevron’s certificate of incorporation contained a clause
granting its board authority to unilaterally adopt bylaws.41 The court
explained that “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part
of a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and
stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL.”42
The contract is malleable by design and subject to change in any
manner consistent with the DGCL;43 investors are assumed to be on
notice of the nature of the contractual relationship when they
purchase stock in a Delaware corporation.44 “[A]n essential part of
the contract stockholders assent to [when purchasing stock in a
corporation that grants the board of directors the power to amend
bylaws] is one that presupposes the board’s authority to adopt
binding bylaws. . . .”45
These Chancery Court opinions encouraged innovative private
ordering responses to multi-forum litigation. The statutory scheme
and judicial recognition of the contractual relationship among
corporate actors enabled corporations to experiment in addressing
internal governance matters.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Grundfest, supra note 1, at 326.
Id.
73 A.3d 934 (2013).
Id. at 939.
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2017); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942.
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 942.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
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B. The Expansion of Litigation Provisions
Shareholders then challenged the board’s ability to unilaterally
adopt fee-shifting provisions. Fee-shifting provisions in commercial
contracts are not rare. In generic form, the prevailing party, in
addition to whatever remedy sought, is awarded attorneys’ fees. Such
provisions displace the standard American Rule, under which each
party pays for his or her own attorney. Fee-shifting provisions
appearing in corporate bylaws, while not uniform, tended to be
unilateral and have a harsh conception of the prevailing party;46 the
average fee-shifting provision permitted the corporation to recover
litigation expenses in all circumstances except when the shareholder
was fully successful.47
The reasoning of the court in Boilermakers provided a logical
foundation to support diverse litigation clauses in corporate bylaws.48
The “corporation-as-contract” metaphor, upon which the court rooted
its decision, had long been influential in corporate law scholarship.49
However, the Boilermaker decision extended that metaphor by
making it literally so.50
With the corporation-as-contract rationale set forth in
Boilermakers and the prominence of fee-shifting provisions in
commercial contracts, the Supreme Court of Delaware readily upheld
the facial validity of the fee-shifting bylaw in ATP Tour, Inc. v.
Deutscher Tennis Bund.51 The court reasoned that neither the DGCL
nor any other Delaware statute prohibited corporations from adopting
fee-shifting provisions,52 and that no principle of common law
prohibited it.53 Moreover, bylaws that “[allocate] risk among parties
in intra-corporate litigation” seem to satisfy the requirement that
bylaws relate “to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its
46. Verity Winship, Shareholder Ligation by Contract, 96 B.U.L. REV. 485, 506 (2016);
Albert H. Choi, Optimal Fee-Shifting Bylaws (U. of Va. Sch. of L., L. & Econ. Res. Paper Ser.,
Working Paper No. 2016-15, 2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload
_documents
/Optimal%20Fee-Shifting%20Bylaws%2010.20.16.pdf (“While the exact meaning of the word,
‘prevail,’ is not entirely clear, courts have ruled that . . . ‘prevail’ does not mean that the party
must have achieved the ‘complete relief’ sought.”).
47. Winship, supra note 46, at 506.
48. Id.
49. Griffith, supra note 22, at 33.
50. Id. at 33–34.
51. 91 A.3d 554 (2014); id. at 558.
52. Id. at 558.
53. Id.
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affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”54 Last, the litigation
provision at issue in ATP Tour would be unenforceable if enacted for
an improper purpose.55 However, the intent to deter litigation is not
unfailingly an improper purpose.56 All fee-shifting provisions work
to deter litigation, yet they are not per se invalid.
As in Boilermakers, the decision in ATP Tour acknowledged
that the enabling statutory framework of the DGCL grants
corporations great latitude in matters of corporate governance. The
flexibility inherent in the statutory framework provided corporations
the opportunity to employ a tailored, private ordering solution to
excessive shareholder litigation.
In the twelve months following the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in ATP Tour, fifty-nine corporations adopted fee-shifting
bylaws.57 Among many corporations, however, there was a
reluctance to enact a provision so seemingly hostile to shareholder
suits.58 Conflict with shareholders and proxy advisory firms would
inevitably follow any enactment of fee-shifting provisions which
would be interpreted as adversarial.59 And it did. Institutional
investors sent letters in support of a proposed bill to forbid feeshifting provisions, and proxy advisory firms urged their clients to
“recommend that shareholders vote to remove directors who adopt
fee-shifting bylaws.”60
C. The End of Litigation Provisions?
Soon after the Delaware Supreme Court approved the use of
loser-pays bylaws, the Corporate Law Council of the Delaware State
Bar Association proposed amendments that would ban fee-shifting
provisions in corporate bylaws.61 Reforms were promptly introduced
and enacted in 2015.62 One amendment expressly permitted a
54. Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2017).
55. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 560.
56. Id.
57. See Fee-Shifting Bylaws, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (May 13, 2015), https://
perma.cc/VGS6-LCP5.
58. Winship, supra note 46, at 511–12.
59. Id. at 513.
60. Id. at 513–14.
61. David A. Skeel Jr., The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 9
(2017).
62. Id. at 10.
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Delaware corporation to adopt bylaws that mandated internal
corporate claims be filed exclusively in Delaware¾a codification of
the Boilermakers decision.63 Simultaneously, the state legislature
enacted an amendment that displaced the Delaware Chancery Court
decision in ATP Tour and forbid provisions “that would impose
liability on a stockholder for the attorney’s fees or expenses of the
corporation [. . .] in connection with an internal corporate claim.”64
Many commentators and attorneys questioned whether the
language of the 2015 amendments forbidding corporations from
including fee-shifting provisions in their charter or bylaws in
connection with internal corporate claims permitted any limited use
of fee-shifting.65 As written, the statute applies to derivative claims
based on a breach of a director’s fiduciary duties.66 Whether the
statute reached claims brought under federal securities law was
debatable.67 Some proposed that this might have been a deliberate
tailoring of the statute that permitted use in securities litigation where
interests on both sides of the Delaware Bar might be injured.68
Others dismissed that theory and offered explanations based on
preemption.69
63. Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729, 732 (Del. Ch. 2016), appeal denied, 154 A.3d 1167
(Del. 2017).
64. Id. at 732–33 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2017)). The last time the state
legislature aggressively redirected the trajectory of Delaware law was in 1986, after Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
Skeel, supra note 61, at 10. In the notorious Delaware Supreme Court decision, the divided court
permitted directors to be personally liable for monetary damages for the breach of the duty of
care. Id. The legislature swiftly amended the DGCL to permit exculpatory bylaw provisions. See
Skeel, supra note 61 for a hypothesis on why the Delaware Legislature took this unusual action to
usurp the ruling of the judiciary.
65. John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in
Federal Court?–The Case for Preemption (Colum. L. Sch., L. & Econ. Res. Paper Ser., Working
Paper No. 498, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508973; J. Robert
Brown Jr., Staying in the Delaware Corporate Governance Lane: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a
Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road 12 (U. of Denv. Sturm C. of L., Legal Stud.
Res. Paper Ser., Working Paper No. 15-23, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2611746.
66. Brown, supra note 65, at 12.
67. Winship, supra note 11, at 913.
68. John C. Coffee, Delaware Throws a Curve Ball, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 16,
2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/16/delaware-throws-a-curveball/; Stephen
Brainbridge, Delaware’s Proposed Ban on Fee Shifting Bylaws and Its Application to Federal
Securities Litigation, PROFESORBRAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.professorbain
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/03/delawares-proposed-ban-on-fee-shifting-bylawsand-its-application-to-federal-securities-litigation.html.
69. See Brown, supra note 65, at 13.
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D. The Solak Decision: Statement of the Case & Reasoning of the
Court
Shortly after the amendments to the DGCL, the Paylocity
Holding Corporation board of directors adopted two new bylaws.70
The board adopted an exclusive forum provision which mandated
that all internal corporate claims be brought in the state of
Delaware¾absent the corporation’s consent otherwise.71 The second
addition to the bylaws, and the basis for the action, shifted the fees
and costs of the corporation to an unsuccessful shareholder who filed
suit outside of the state of Delaware without the consent of the
corporation.72 The corporation could only invoke the fee-shifting
provision in the limited circumstance that an unsuccessful
shareholder brought an intracorporate claim outside of Delaware.73
The court made short shrift of Paylocity’s argument that the dual
enactment of the DGCL amendments conveyed the intent of the
legislature to permit limited fee-shifting provisions.74 Relying on the
unambiguous statutory language that prohibited corporate bylaws
from including “any provision” that “would shift to a stockholder the
attorneys’ fees or expenses incurred by the corporation ‘in
connection with an internal corporate claim,’ irrespective of where
such a claim is filed,” the court held the fee-shifting provision
invalid.75 A fee-shifting provision that is only triggered when a claim
is filed outside the state of Delaware cannot escape the purpose or
effect of the unconditional ban on fee-shifting provisions.76
Next, the court addressed Paylocity’s meritless assertion that the
DGCL did not displace the common law, which permits fee-shifting
provisions.77 The court distinguished fee-shifting provisions in a
private contract, an issue presented in an earlier opinion, from a feeshifting provision in bylaws.78 In fact, the legislative synopsis
expressly distinguished the two forms when it indicated that the

70. Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729, 733 (Del. Ch. 2016), appeal denied, 154 A.3d 1167
(Del. 2017).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 741–42.
75. Id. at 741.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 742.
78. Id.
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amendment was not intended “to prevent the application of any
provision in a stockholder agreement or other writing signed by the
stockholder against whom the provision is to be enforced.”79 Given
the clear statutory authority banning such provisions, the court
concluded that Paylocity’s fee-shifting bylaw could not be exercised
lawfully under any circumstances.80 The fee-shifting bylaw adopted
by Paylocity unquestionably violated the newly amended DGCL
109(b) clause prohibiting the use of fee-shifting provisions.
The use and debate over fee-shifting provisions is not over;
forty-nine states have yet to ban their use, and at least one state,
Oklahoma, expressly permits them.81 Corporations may be swayed to
incorporate or re-incorporate in states more amenable to fee-shifting
provisions and other private ordering solutions. A framework for
understanding the relationship between corporate actors must be
explored and an enabling statutory scheme encouraging
experimentation in corporate governance must be established.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part reviews the literature and explores implications of the
Solak case. After engaging in the current discussion of shareholder
litigation provisions, this Comment advocates for statutory
frameworks that provide entities with the flexibility to experiment
with private ordering solutions. Finally, this section concludes with
insights for the future orientation of bylaws.
A. Issues of Contract and Consent
In the context of divisive views on the value and role of
shareholder litigation, legislative and other responses have proven
unable to effectively address an unyielding rise in litigation.
However, diverse interests have embraced the corporation-ascontract paradigm.82 Innovative experimentation in private ordering
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 743.
81. See OK. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2015) (“In any derivative action instituted by a
shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon final
judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party or parties the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a result of such
action.”).
82. See Verity Winship, Shareholder Ligation by Contract, 96 B.U.L. REV. 485, 506 (2016);
D. Gordon Smith et. al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125
(2011).
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solutions enables firms to identify and customize procedures for their
unique needs.
The flexible corporate contract provides a negotiation platform
for both shareholders and directors. Professors Farr and Clark’s work
counsels a rejection of uniform and universal governance systems
where private ordering is not possible.83 Their work recognizes that
entities have specific and distinct needs which require different
governance structures.84 Empowering shareholders to contract
through shareholder bylaws, they argue, provides the opportunity to
“to create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire
corporate governance system.”85 Other commentators may challenge
shareholder activism with institutional competency arguments, but
they nonetheless would endorse the preference for private ordering.
Moreover, they would agree that, “[i]n a system in which private
ordering is encouraged, corporate bylaws, through experience and
adaptation, become solutions to common governance problems faced
by corporations.”86
Scholars’ most prominent criticism of the corporation-ascontract paradigm concerns the issue of consent. Bylaws, which are
procedural and process-oriented, “‘set forth the rules by which the
corporate board conducts its business’ and ‘the procedures through
which board and committee action is taken.’”87 While different
corporate governance documents implicate adherence to different
procedures, bylaws tend to be the most problematic.88 This is
because DGCL 109(b) vests the authority to amend the bylaws in the
shareholders, and yet, also allows the certificate of incorporation to
delegate authority to amend bylaws to the directors.89 If a
corporation has such a provision in its certificate of incorporation,
this means that the bylaws may be adopted, amended, or repealed
unilaterally by the board of directors (i.e., without the need for
shareholder approval).90

83. Smith, supra note 82, at 188.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 174.
87. Winship, supra note 46, at 495.
88. See id. at 496.
89. Id.
90. Id. Importantly, shareholders have the irrevocable concurrent right to adopt, amend, or
appeal bylaws. Id.
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Given the validity of private ordering procedures in consumer
and commercial contracts, the legitimacy of private ordering
procedures in corporate bylaws would seem to be an accepted
application.91 However, consent in the corporate contract is consent
to the corporate governance structure, not to any individual provision
adopted by the board.92 Investors are deemed on notice of the board’s
authority to enact bylaws and bound by their terms.93 Thus, unlike
the purchase of goods¾where the terms are presented in full before
the transaction is complete¾in a stock purchase, the central but
implicit term consented to is the power and authority of the board.
Beyond the issue of consent, scholars have attempted to mark
the boundaries of shareholder litigation provisions. Substantive law,
like a natural border, proves an intuitive line of demarcation.
Accordingly, the scope of procedural provisions would be best
decided by corporate substantive law.94 This reasoned argument is
concerned with the ability to skirt mandatory substantive law through
artful shaping procedures.95 “If a party cannot contract around a
substantive obligation, then the party should not be able to eliminate
it by disabling enforcement.”96 By way of example, if substantive
corporate law mandates fiduciary duties, those duties could not be
circumvented by contractually prohibiting claims for their
enforcement.97 A recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision
illustrated the scope of permissible bylaws when it invalidated a
removal provision unilaterally adopted by the board of directors.98
The board amended a bylaw governing the removal of directors.99 As
amended, the bylaw provided that director removal required a two-

91. The Supreme Court has signaled its approval of contract procedures. See Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
92. Winship, supra note 46, at 497–98.
93. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955–56 (Del. Ch.
2013); Winship, supra note 46, at 498.
94. Winship, supra note 46, at 522.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Winship distinguishes procedural limits that do not rise to the level of waiver from
effective elimination of those rights. However, even in the case of waiver, Winship does not
advocate an outright ban, but asserts that such provisions “would trigger heightened consent
requirements.” Id. at 526.
98. Frechter v. Zier, C.A. No. 12038-VCG, 2017 WL 345142, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017).
99. Id. at *3.
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thirds majority vote of shareholders rather than the simple majority
requirement of the DGCL.100
The scope of permissible bylaw provisions turns back to the
issue of consent. Even for those accepting of the corporation-ascontract model, there are provisions that confront the limits of the
doctrine of corporate consent.101 Professor Lawrence Hamermesh
proposes four principles to identify whether provisions “should be
deemed contrary to law, and not the product of meaningful
consent.”102 While all four principles undoubtedly inform the notion
of consent, only one of his suggested criteria does not call for a
reformation of the Delaware court’s doctrine of corporate consent:
“whether [a] provision impairs some strong and reasonable
expectation on the part of investors, in light of other known elements
of the so-called corporate contract.”103
Shareholders consent to a governance structure and defer to the
discretion of a board with some basic expectations of the
relationship.104 Hamermesh’s expectation principle aligns with the
themes of the DGCL105 and the concern over procedural provisions
intended to evade substantive law¾which aim to protect the interests
of shareholders. However, identifying and defining “reasonable
expectations” is not without issues.106 In addition to the problems
inherent in any standard of reasonableness, expectations are not
static.107 The substantive law should, therefore, be the only restraint
on the scope of bylaws.
Substantive law need not act as a complete bar to shareholder
litigation provisions. As mentioned above, restrictions that fall short
of forfeiting a right may be permitted. Provisions that amount to a
waiver could also be permitted, but required to meet a stricter
standard of consent.108 For example, a majority of shareholders
would be required to approve a specific provision that waives

100. Id. at *3–4; 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (West 2017).
101. See Lawerence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, WIDENER L. S CH. LEGAL
STUD. RES. PAPER SER. NO. 14-31, Aug. 2014, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2488209.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Such as the directors and officers acting in profit maximizing ways.
105. The DGCL requires shareholder approval for specified transactions.
106. Hamermesh, supra note 101, at 16.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Winship, supra note 46, at 526.
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substantive law.109 Courts may also employ a more flexible sliding
scale model, requiring something approaching actual consent110 the
closer a provision fell towards waiver, while relying on consent to
the governance structure in provisions which merely offend
substantive rights.111 Support for such a model exists and was
illustrated in the court’s reasoning in Solak, which distinguished
between bylaw provisions and terms in a private contract.112
Recognizing the force and effect of a given provision will halt
bylaws that evade the law while allowing innovative experimentation
that addresses matters of corporate concern, such as excessive
shareholder litigation.113
Other scholars, recognizing the versatility of private ordering
responses, appear more interested in the substance and effect of
shareholder litigation provisions promulgated by corporate boards.
Boards adopted shareholder litigation provisions in an effort to deter
frivolous litigation. But few asked whether it worked¾whether the
provisions had the precise effect of deterring frivolous litigation
while leaving room for meritorious claims.
The one-sided fee-shifting arrangements at issue in Solak and
ATP Tour threatened to deter even meritorious suits.114 The
provisions adopted by ATP Tour and Paylocity impose fee liability
on shareholders in nearly every instance. 115 Economic analysis
reveals that a shareholder is less likely to bring a case with a high
probability of success under a Paylocity or ATP Tour type feeshifting provision.116 This is particularly true where the probability of
partial recovery is substantial.117
109. Id.
110. Given that actual consent would require unanimous approval, that need not be the
standard.
111. Winship, supra note 46, at 528.
112. See supra Part II.D. However, this appears to undermine the Delaware Court’s
corporation-as-contract logic. Specifically, the reliance upon the language of the statutory
synopsis, which emphasizes the difference between bylaws and other documents such as a
shareholder agreement that is signed by the shareholder it is to be enforced against.
113. Winship, supra note 46, at 528.
114. Choi, supra note 46, at 3–4.
115. The provisions are worded such that the plaintiff must “achieve [the] . . . full remedy
sought” to avoid triggering liability. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554
(Del. 2014); Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729(Del. Ch. 2016), appeal denied, 154 A.3d 1167
(Del. 2017).
116. See Choi, supra note 46, at 12. In the Solak provision, the effect on shareholder litigation
would be limited to claims brought outside the state of Delaware.
117. Id.
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What shareholder would risk incurring millions of dollars of
liability to right a wrong for a minimal monetary award? A
shareholder brings a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation and
any recovery flows back to the corporation.118 Considering that it is
typically an attorney initiating suit, he or she would likely have to
agree to reimburse the shareholder for any liability incurred through
suit before a shareholder would sign on to be lead plaintiff.119
Under the corporate benefit doctrine, the corporate defendant
pays the shareholder plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. The doctrine works
one way, creating asymmetry. Fee-shifting provisions adopted by
ATP Tour and Paylocity are similarly asymmetrical, imposing fees in
only one direction. Arguably, both the corporate benefit doctrine and
fee-shifting provisions are sub-optimal.120 In either case, the rule is
over-inclusive and fails to discriminate between meritorious and
baseless suits.121 A more equitable and measured fee-shifting scheme
could produce an efficient screening mechanism that does not
obliterate all deterrents or incentives to litigation.
One means of correcting the asymmetry of the corporate benefit
doctrine is to modify its use. The doctrine has been applied beyond
its confines to contexts not justified by its origins.122 The corporate
benefit doctrine originated as a fee-sharing arrangement.123 Feesharing first appeared as the “sharing of fees among all beneficiaries
of a fund recovered for the ‘common benefit.’”124 This practice and
rationale lent itself to derivative suits. As the Supreme Court of
Minnesota reasoned, “[s]ince the corporation is the beneficiary of the
recovery of funds or of the corrective benefit of the action, it should
stand the expense of it.”125 The doctrine has grown beyond its own
logic, and the sharing of fees and costs among plaintiffs has devolved
into the shifting of fees and costs to defendants.126
Scholars have proposed a refinement of the corporate benefit
doctrine that would restore the concept to the confines of its
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 20.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 22.
122. Griffith, supra note 22, at 41.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 37–38.
125. Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass’n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 1960).
126. Griffith, supra note 22, at 41–42. Griffith traces the modern day form of this doctrine,
the Delaware rule, to a 1989 Delaware Supreme Court decision.
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origins.127 The suggestions, while narrowly tailored to preserve the
benefits that serve the justifications of the doctrine, require judicial
and legislative action. Alternatively, a private ordering response that
opts out of the corporate benefit doctrine would correct the
imbalance in the award of attorneys’ fees that incentivizes attorney
initiated shareholder litigation.128
B. Toward a Solution?
A review of the literature reveals that the discourse of private
ordering and shareholder ligation does not need to answer what the
proper role of institutional actors may be, or determine the right
amount of shareholder litigation; those are partisan questions best
left to be resolved by corporations and their shareholders. Rather, the
contribution of scholarly debate must be to create a paradigm for
conceptualizing the nature of the relationship.
The corporation-as-contract model provides an appropriate and
accepted method for understanding the rights of affected parties. The
model allows insightful arguments to be extended by both critics and
proponents of board-adopted bylaws and is informed by the rich
history of common law. Moreover, envisioning the corporation as a
matter of contract protects the enabling character of corporate law by
allowing private parties to negotiate agreements that reflect their
interests.
A potential perimeter for such provisions, although not
discussed in the literature, would be to invoke the standard
contractual limitation on terms against public policy. Despite the
ability of a public policy limitation to leave undisturbed the
corporation-as-contract model favored by the Delaware courts, such
an approach invites judicial activism and may lead to concern over
the neutrality of a court.129
Substantive law furnishes a sensible and objective boundary to
delineate the permissible scope of bylaws adopted unilaterally by a
board. Employing this limit on the board’s authority to independently
adopt provisions provides a defined, but expansive, field of
127. See id. at 47.
128. Some commentators are not persuaded that shareholder litigation is anything but a
nuisance, and contend there would be no loss from the elimination of shareholder ligation. See
Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 875.
129. See Skeel, supra note 61, at 23.
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autonomy for corporate actors. Any provisions contrary to
substantive law could still be adopted, but like major transactions or
amendments to the corporate charter, would require some affirmation
by stockholders. Maintaining the agility of a board to respond to
particular or generalized issues in ways that protect the interests of
the corporation is essential to efficiency and innovation.
Delaware is¾or has been¾the darling of corporate law. Many
businesses choose to incorporate, or reincorporate, in Delaware.130
The small state has been the favored state of incorporation since the
1900s.131 As such, the DGCL and the opinions from the Delaware
Court of the Chancery have been influential sources of corporate
law. The DGCL gained notoriety as one of the most flexible and
advanced collections of corporation statutes in the United States.132
Although it may seem a bit dramatic, the recent turn of events
has led commentators to question Delaware’s continued
preeminence. Given the astonishing amount of shareholder litigation,
a single prohibitory amendment is of great significance. At least one
state, Oklahoma, amended its corporate code to expressly permit feeshifting provisions.133 Many anxiously anticipate that conservative
and pro-business states will follow in an effort to entice
incorporation and re-incorporation in their state.
The issue of fee-shifting provisions remains unresolved, and the
scope of unilateral board adopted bylaws continues to be undefined.
The Solak opinion confirms that Delaware will not permit even a
limited fee-shifting provision. Although the Delaware courts were
originally amenable to another approach to fee-shifting bylaws, the
legislature’s amendments to the DGCL left the Chancery Court with
little choice but to rule as it did in Solak. This signaling of
intolerance increases the allure of incorporation, or reincorporation,
in other states that are more enabling of private ordering. As such, a
framework for understanding the relationship of corporate parties
and their respective rights is of great importance.
130. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (Del. Dep’t. of State
Div. of Corps.) (2007), https://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/whycorporations_english.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Stephen Bainbridge, Oklahoma Leads On Fee Shifting Bylaws, Will Delaware and
MCBA
Follow?,
PROFESSORBRAINBRIDGE.COM
(Oct.
2,
2014),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/10/oklahoma-leads-on-feeshifting-bylaws-will-delaware-and-mbca-follow.html.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates enabling statutory schemes that grant
entities the space and flexibility to innovatively experiment in their
corporate governance structures. Employing a “corporation-ascontract” framework grants boards the autonomy to act in original
ways that further the corporation’s interests and residually benefits
the corporate field. They must do so, however, in a manner which
distinguishes procedural from substantive shareholder rights and
adopt a sliding scale approach to tailor appropriate restrictions or
limitations designed to properly balance shareholder and corporate
interests to achieve equitable yet efficient outcomes.
Private ordering responses will continue to be a subject of
debate among scholars. New challenges to creative corporate
maneuvers will erupt in further brouhahas.134 The diversity of
governance choices permitted by enabling statutory schemes
provides an exciting landscape for original processes and
mechanisms for controlling and directing corporations. Research
must not succumb to partisanship or entrenched positions. Legal
analysis that provides a consistent framework for conceptualizing the
relationship and rights of respective parties must be pursued.

134. See Grundfest, supra note 1, at 1.
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